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FOREWORD
MARRIAGE, FAMILY AND THE POSITIVE LAW
TERESA STANTON COLLETT*
"May you live in interesting times" is reputed to be an
ancient Chinese curse. For many people seeking to defend the
traditional understanding of marriage and family in the public
square, the accuracy of this characterization is readily apparent.
Truly we are living in interesting times, and the consequences
appear to be chaotic. Yet another proverb teaches "in chaos,
there is opportunity." The articles in this issue of the Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics, and Public Policy identify some of the rea-
sons for the seemingly chaotic public discourse concerning the
family and suggest certain criteria for distinguishing the opportu-
nities that may yield a truer description of marriage and family.
This foreword explores the question of whether the content
of the positive law matters when dealing with marriage and fam-
ily. I conclude that the content of positive law does matter, in so
far as it acts as an interpretative filter for our experiences. Yet
the law in this area is limited by the fact that it deals with a reality
which is more primal than law. A partial description of the met-
aphysical reality of marriage and family is provided in hopes that
this description will contribute some measure of certainty when
assessing proposed changes in the law regulating marriage and
family.
I. THE POWER AND LIMITS OF POSITIVE LAW's DESCRIPTION OF
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY
At the outset it is important to delineate the relationship of
positive law to marriage and family. Advocates on both sides of
the "culture war"1 demand that the law be altered to more accu-
* Visiting Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; Professor of Law,
South Texas College of Law.
1. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE
AMERICA (1991) (describing the clash of ideals held by those who have a theistic
understanding and those who have a secular understanding of the culture).
For general discussion of this polarization, see STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE
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rately reflect their view of marriage and family. Implicit in these
demands is a common belief that the content of the positive law
matters. Neither side uniformly provides an extended explana-
tion of why or how it matters, yet these unaddressed issues are at
least equally important in explaining the depth of emotion
revealed in public discussions of family law issues. Divergent
understanding of why and how positive law relates to the family
and marriage account for the more complex divisions of opinion
that exist beyond the simplistic "left-wing/religious right" dichot-
omy presented in the media.
The role of positive law in contemporary society is complex.
Clearly it has the coercive function thatJustice Holmes described
as the bad man's understanding of law.2 The criminal law exem-
plifies society's use of law to coerce or prohibit conduct. Law
also has a constitutive function, in that the positive law creates
certain relationships or duties. The juridical personhood of the
corporation is an example of the constitutive or creative power of
the law. Finally law has a teaching function. The continuing
existence of laws prohibiting adultery illustrates this function. In
debates surrounding the repeal of adultery laws, legislators
express concern that repealing such laws may be construed as
approval of conduct that many people believe is immoral.
Family law functions in all of these ways. For example, it
coerces parents to provide medical care, even when the pro-
posed treatment violate the religious beliefs of the parents and
the child.' By adoption, the positive law enables people to enter
into family relationships where none previously existed. No-fault
divorce teaches that marriage is a matter of mutual consent and
endures only so long as consent continues.
These multiple functions of the law lead to the current con-
flict over its content. Should sexual relationships between adults
be criminally sanctioned because the adults are legally related as
CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVlALIZE RELIGIOUS
DEVOTION 15, 22 (1993) (deploring the ways in which secular-oriented culture
treats religious belief as just another hobby").
2. See Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457,
459 (1897) ("If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it
as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such
knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for
conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of
conscience.").
3. See Jehovah's Witnesses in State of Wash. v. King County Hospital Unit
No. 1 (Harborview), 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967).
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step-parent and step-child?4 Should new legal rights for children
be created?5 Should the positive law teach that marriage is per-
manent?6 Debate of these and related questions necessarily
includes debate over the function of law in our society. And the
outcome of this debate will be experienced at the most basic
level of society - in our homes.
In resolving these questions, it is important to recognize that
law is confined by the reality experienced by people. Unlike cor-
porate law, which is purely the product of legal imagination and
therefore wholly subject to the positive law, the law governing
family and marriage is constrained by the reality of the human
relationships it seeks to regulate. In order to be effective the law
must be truthful in its description of relationships existing
independent of the law.' For example, it is conceivable that the
positive law could define the relationship of parent and child to
include the relationship of a childless pet owner to his or her pet.
Yet such a definition would ultimately fail because people would
not recognize this relationship regardless of the law's teaching.
Instead people would ignore the positive law, and distinguish the
relationship between the child and the human father or mother
from the relationship of Rover and his or her owner. When law
is untruthful, ultimately it fails in its ultimate purpose - to pro-
mote the common good.
To say law must be truthful when it describes and regulates
preexisting relationships is not to say that law must, or has the
capacity to, contain the full truth of the human relationships we
are attempting to describe by the words "marriage" or "family".
Positive law can only regulate the actions of people, not the dis-
position of their hearts. As a tool of the state, it may only prop-
erly regulate those actions that detract from or contribute to the
common good. Its appropriate sphere of authority is limited to
those actions and relationships that cannot be governed effec-
tively by other more primary relationships like family and reli-
4. Jeannette Lofas, Yes, the Allen-Soon-Yi Affair Is Incest, NEWSDAY, Aug. 27,
1992, at 103 (discussing the implications of Woody Allen's romance with his
step-daughter).
5. See generally Volume 7, Issue 2 of NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
(Symposium on the Rights of Children).
6. See Christopher Wolfe, The Marriage of Your Choice, FIRST THINGS, Feb.
1995, at 37.
7. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE,
LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 16 (1989) ("Legal
norms, to be sure, often may have some effect on the way people think, feel,
and act, but it is striking how stubbornly the forms of behavior involved in
family life seem to follow their own patterns independently of the legal
system.").
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gious community. As a limited mechanism of social control, the
law's description of family and marriage need only be partial.
For example, it is true that marriage is a mutual gift of self
between husbands and wives,8 but how could the positive law
embody this truth? And for what purpose? Shall the state create
a cause of action between spouses for failure to share their most
intimate thoughts and desires? Shall the state become the arbi-
ter of disputes regarding just allocation of familial duties and
tasks? Surely not. The law is too clumsy a tool to fine-tune the
relationships of love and trust that marriage and family are
intended to be.
While positive law has only a limited capacity to influence
the relationships we call family and marriage, the content of the
law remains important. This is particularly true today since the
content of the positive law is often understood to be the most
widely-accepted statement of our common beliefs. Its unifying
effect on the perception of our experiences is illustrated by the
dramatic shift in public opinion concerning de jure segregation
and abortion. In the first instance the teaching effect of the civil
rights laws has unified the nation in a belief that race should not
be the basis for extending privileges or forbidding participation.9
In the second instance the law has taught a significant part of an
entire generation that abortion is a matter of personal liberty."l
Whether the law can or should effectively eliminate considera-
tion of race, or free women from the obligations arising from
sexual intercourse are questions that need not be answered in
this article. Instead I raise these questions to illustrate the power
of law, and to make the point that the content of the positive law
matters. It matters because, at a minimum, the law acts as a lens
through which we view our experiences.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF MARRIAGE
Because law unavoidably affects our perception of reality, it
is critical that the law governing marriage and family be truth-
ful. n Therefore, we must ask: what is a truthful description of
8. POPE JOHN PAUL II, Letter to Families, No. 11 (1994) [hereinafter Letter to
Families].
9. The accuracy of this statement is not diminished by the current debate
over affirmative action. The debate may provide further evidence of the
widespread belief that race should be irrelevant in decision making.
10. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) ("An entire
generation has come of age free to assume Roe's concept of liberty in defining
the capacity of women to act in society, and to make reproductive
decisions.. ").
11. But see Letter to Families, supra note 8, at No. 17.
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marriage? There are at least five characteristics that may be
definitive of the metaphysical reality called marriage. These are:
1) permanent duration; 2) mutually supportive; 3) consensual
and committed; 4) exclusive; and 5) open to the creation of new
life. Each of these characteristics have been challenged in cur-
rent debates.
A. Permanent Duration
In her historical review of the institution of marriage in
Western European nations, Professor Mary Ann Glendon found
that marriage has always been defined as a relationship of
extended duration, but subject to dissolution by mutual consent
during many periods of history. 2 With the rise of Christianity's
influence marriage came to be viewed as a life-time commitment,
subject to dissolution only for grave reasons."i Once established,
this ideal of marriage as a life-time commitment held sway in
Western European countries until the mid-1960's.14 Laws then
began to recognize or expand the application of no-fault and
mutual consent divorce statutes. 5 This change in the positive
law has led to multiple sequential marriages. 6
The resulting "divorce revolution," however, is under
attack. 7 Calls for recognition that permanent marriage should
be the presumption of the positive law, absent compelling rea-
sons for dissolution, come from divergent groups for a variety of
reasons. Reviewing the undisputed evidence that men prosper
and women and children suffer economically after divorce, some
feminists now support a return to a requirement of cause for
divorce.1" The same evidence convinces some fiscal conservatives
that protection of the public purse from claims for assistance
12. GLENDON, supra note 7, at 17-34.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 149.
15. Id.
16. Some commentators refer to this as "serial polygamy." See, e.g., Daniel
D. Polsby, Ozzie and Harriet Had It Right, 18 HAav. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 531 (1995);
Robert J. Levy, Rights and Responsibilities for Extended Family Members , 27 FAMuv.
L.Q. 191 (1993).
17. See LENORE J. WErrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE
UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN
IN AMERICA (1985) (discussing the negative social and economic effects of the
divorce revolution on women and children).
18. See Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction
and Social Change: A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the
Consequences of Divorce, 1983 WISC. L. REv. 789 (1983).
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compels a rethinking of no-fault divorce. 9  Advocates for a
return to traditional morality argue that permanency in marriage
is required to provide stability in rearing the next generation,
and mutual support throughout the lives of the spouses.2" Reli-
gious arguments also support a return to permanency on the
basis of the metaphysical reality of marriage.2
Life-long devotion characteristic of marriage permits not
only a more complete revelation and gift of self, but also provides
a shared history from which to learn more fully the goodness of
life and the joy of shared existence.
B. Mutually Supportive
Mutual support is another characteristic of marriage that has
been recognized throughout history and in all cultures.22 Often
articulated in state statutes23 and judicial opinions,24 this duty
encompasses both the sharing of emotional2" and financial
19. See Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 869 (1994); see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking
About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REv. 9, 10 (1990) .
20. Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991
B.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 79-80 (1991).
21. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, Letter to Families, supra note 8, at No. 7. Cf Blu
Greenberg, Women and Judaism in CONTEMPORARY JEWISH RELIGIOUS THOUGHT:
ORIGINAL ESSAYS ON CRITICAL CONCEPTS, MOVEMENTS, AND BELIEFS 1039, 1046
(Authur A. Cohen & Paul Mendes-Flohr, eds., 1987) [hereinafter Greenburg,
Women and Judaism] ("A Jewish marriage is terminated by either death or the
giving of a get, the writ of divorce."); AsAF A. A. FYZEE, OUTLINES OF
MUHAMMADAN LAW 124 (4th ed. 1974) [hereinafter FVZEE, MUHAMMADAN LAW]
("It [a contract regarding marriage] may also provide for the dissolution of the
marriage by the wife, without the intervention of the court.")
22. GLENDON, supra note 7, at 110-13.
23. See, e.g., LA. Cir. CODE ANN. art. 98 (West 1993); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3103.03 (Anderson-Supp. 1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 765.001(2) (West
1993).
24. E.g., Landmark Medical Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145, 1152 (R.I.
1994) ("One of the principal incidents of marriage that continues to evolve has
been the obligation of mutual support."); Brookhart v. Brookhart, No.
93CA1569, 1993 WL 483206 at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 18, 1993) ("It is clear to
us that when parties marry they assume mutual obligations of maintenance and
support."); Braatz v. Labor and Industry Review Commission, 496 N.W.2d 597,
600 (Wisc. 1993) ("Wisconsin law imposes a mutual duty of general support
upon married couples, but there is no comparable duty of support imposed
upon adult companions."); Dunaway v. Dunaway, 560 N.E.2d 171, 175 (Ohio
1990) ("It is clear to us that when parties marry they assume mutual obligations
of maintenance and support. It is a conscious election to share life together,
and this necessarily includes financial circumstances.").
25. Blazek v. Superior Court, 869 P.2d 509, 513 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)
(evidentiary privilege protecting marital communications grounded in the
intimacy and mutual support between spouses).
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resources.26 This sharing of resources is the basis for the positive
law governing spousal privilege, 7 taxation, and property owner-
ship. It is presumed in laws defining creditors' rights and gov-
ernmental entitlements, and is a major consideration in crafting
laws regarding the obligations that continue after divorce.
Mutual support recognizes the natural division of labor
which evolves when people undertake shared tasks - "You cook
dinner, and I'll clean up afterward." This allocation of tasks is
one way that couples create a shared life. Alternatively the com-
mon law recognized that many married couples arranged this
sharing of day-to-day tasks by spheres of authority. Wives were
responsible for home and hearth, and often reigned unchal-
lenged in domestic matters. Husbands created or acquired the
resources necessary to make domestic life possible with little
input from their wives.2" While modern conveniences and ser-
vice providers have lessened the time required to maintain a
home - we no longer must make our soap, bake our bread, or
sew our family's clothes - this division of labor continues to be
observed by many families, particularly while raising young chil-
dren. Regardless of the specific form adopted by any particular
couple, mutual support and sharing of day-to-day tasks remains a
fundamental characteristic of marriage.
C. Consensual and Committed
Initial consent is another characteristic of marriage that is
uniformly recognized throughout Western European nations.2 9
Yet it is important to distinguish initial consent to the marriage
from the current, yet pernicious idea that a marriage continues
to exist legitimately only when husband and wife give continuing
consent. One of the myths of our day is that any obligation to
another must be the result of consent. Reflection reveals both
the inaccuracy and undesirability of such a state of affairs. Many
important obligations arise in relationships that are not the prod-
uct of explicit consent by the participants. At least two morally
26. Carminucci v. Carminucci, No. FA9401387675, 1996 WL 88428 at *5
(Conn. Super. Feb. 14, 1996) ("The figures offered by the defendant to prove
how much he spent during the marriage in order to obtain reimbursement for
those expenditures are difficult to accept seriously. One of the obligations of
marriage is mutual support. If the defendant feels that his expenditures
somehow were not part of his obligations to support his wife during that time,
perhaps he needs enlightening on that point.")
27. See Blazek, supra note 25.
28. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERiCA (1985).
29. GLENDON, supra note 7, at 38.
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significant relationships arise before we are capable of even the
most rudimentary consent - parent-child and citizen-state. The
newborn does not consent to either of these relationships, yet
the child owes certain duties and has certain rights by virtue of
these relationships.
How do the obligations of marriage differ from those of par-
ent-child or citizen-state? Unlike the status of citizen, daughter,
or son, the status of wife or husband is dependent upon consent
for its creation. This is true because of the fundamental nature
of marriage. There can be no gift of self from the unwilling
giver. Obedience, protection, sharing of possessions - all of
these can be received from an unwilling giver, but not the
essence of marriage. Thus consent must exist at the outset.
30
However, consent to marriage is not the omniscient exercise
of enlightened self-interest that much of modern contract law
envisions. Instead it is a statement of personal commitment -
an agreement to consistently will the good of another through
the gift of self.3 1 This is true because the decision to marry is
made with incomplete knowledge. At the time of the marriage
ceremony, it is impossible to fully understand the past exper-
iences and present desires of the other. No amount of "due dili-
gence" will completely eliminate this fact. Even more mysterious
are the future events that both husband and wife must respond
to as they live out their commitment to be married. Thus what
begins by consent continues, not by continuous reconsideration
30. See Letter to Families, supra note 8, at Nos. 8, 10, 11. See also Greenberg,
Women and Judaism, surpa note 21, at 1045 ("Rabbinic law states that a woman
may not be married without her consent."); FYZEE, MUHAMMADAN LAW, supra
note 21, at 88 ("Juristically, it [marriage] is a contract and not a sacrament.
Qua contract, it has three characteristics: (i) there can be no marriage without
consent; (ii) as in a contract, provisition is made for its breach, to wit, the
various kinds of dissolution by act of parties or by operation of law; (iii) the
terms of a marriage contract are within legal limits capable of being altered to
suit individual cases.").
31. See POPE PAUL VI, Humanae Vitae [On the Regulation of Birth] No. 9
(1968):
• . . [Marriage is] principally, an act of the free will, intended to
endure and to grow by means of the joys and sorrows of daily life, in
such a way that husband and wife become one only heart and one only
soul, and together attain their human perfection.
Then, this love is total, that is to say, it is a very special form of
personal friendship, in which husband and wife generously share
everything, without undue reservations or selfish calculations.
Whoever truly loves his marriage partner loves not only for what he
receives, but for the partner's self, rejoicing that he can enrich his
partner with the gift of himself.
Id (emphasis in original).
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and renewal of the initial consent, but by acts of will, intellect,
spirit and body consistent with the commitment expressed by the
initial "I do." 2
D. Exclusive
Marriage, as total gifts of self between husband and wife, is
only fully experienced in an exclusive relationship. Implicit in
the idea of exclusivity is the loyalty and intimacy enjoyed within
the "bonds of matrimony." Exclusivity is a necessary condition for
the complete revelation of self that marriage entails. In part,
exclusivity eliminates any basis for comparison. This avoids the
danger of devaluing the unique gift of the spouse, and the dam-
age suffered from being evaluated, rather than loved.
Also limiting marriage to monogamous relationships affirms
the equality of husband and wife. Both are the exclusive object
of the other's affection and attention. In some societies recogniz-
ing polygamous marriage, the danger of wives being treated
unequally is addressed by statutory requirements. Judicial
approval of multiple unions is required, and that is conditioned
upon a finding that the economic circumstances of each wife is
assured, and that "there is no serious doubt regarding equal
treatment of all wives." 3 While these requirements seemingly
promise equality among the wives, no attention is given the
inherent inequality between husbands and wives as persons. The
husband receives the undiluted devotion of several women, while
each wife receives only a partial portion of the man's love and
attention. 4 This inequality may come to be viewed as a compar-
ative measure of the worth of each spouse, resulting in a deval-
uing of women - both in the home and in the larger society.
This inequality of persons may be the basis for the Supreme
Court's observation that polygamy is inconsistent with our consti-
tutional system of government.35
32. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-211 (1888).
33. HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAw: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 6-7
(3d ed. 1990).
34. A Biblical example of the consequences of unequal devotion to both
wives can be found in the story of Jacob, Leah and Rachel. See Genesis 29-35.
35. This may the unstated premise of the Court in Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1878):
Upon it [marriage] society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits
spring social relations and social obligations and duties, with which
government is necessarily required to deal. In fact, according as
monogamous or polygamous marriages are allowed, do we find the
principles on which the government of the people, to a greater or less
extent, rests. Professor Lieber says, polygamy leads to the patriarchal
principle, and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the
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E. Open to the Creation of New Life
Marriage has been described as a communion of two giving
rise to a community of persons greater than the two.3 6 The
expansive nature of married love between complementary per-
sons is most fully realized in the creation of children. By conceiv-
ing and nurturing children, the couple exhibit a willingness to be
joined together beyond their lifetimes. Willingly bearing chil-
dren evidences faith in the goodness of life, regardless of the
present circumstances.3 7
Many contemporary judges and commentators ground the
state's recognition of marriage as a legal institution in the fact
that children are most commonly created and nurtured in the
context of marriage. The opinion from the United States District
Court for the Central District of California in Adams v. Howerton
is an example of this:
[T] he main justification in this age for societal recognition
and protection of the institution of marriage is procrea-
tion, perpetuation of the race. Plaintiffs argue that some
persons are allowed to marry and their union is given full
recognition and constitutional protection even though the
above-stated justification-procreation-is not possible.
They point to marriages being sanctioned between couples
who are sterile because of age or physical infirmity, and
between couples who make clear that they have chosen not
to have children. Plaintiffs go on to claim that sanctioning
such unions within the protection of legal marriage, while
excluding their union, constitutes an illegal discrimina-
tion. In my view, if the classification of the group who may
validly marry is over inclusive, it does not affect the validity
people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist
in connection with monogamy.
Id.
36. POPEJOHN PAUL II, Familiaris Consortio [On the Family] No. 21 (1981);
see also Letter to Families, supra note 8, at Nos. 7, 9; David Biale, Family in
CONTEMPORARY JEWISH RELIGIOUS THOUGHT: ORIGINAL ESSAYS ON CRITICAL
CONCEPTS, MOVEMENTS, AND BELIEFS 239 (Authur A. Cohen and Paul Mendes-
Flohr, eds., 1987) ("To marry and have children thus became a cardinal
religious duty incumbent on all Jewish men; women were excluded from this
commandment, although the biblical verse seems clearly directed at both sexes.
Yet marriage is not solely a union for purposes of procreation. Since woman
was created from man's rib (Gen. 2:21-24), the unification of their bodies in
marriage is a result of a natural tendency to make complete that which was
originally sundered apart.").
37. Commentators have explained the high birth rates in war-ravaged
nations in this manner. See, e.g., Tracy Wilkinson, Bosnian Women Repudiate
Death by Giving Birth, LA. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1995, at Al.
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of the classification. In traditional equal protection termi-
nology, it seems beyond dispute that the state has a com-
pelling interest in encouraging and fostering procreation
of the race and providing status and stability to the envi-
ronment in which children are raised. This has always been
one of society's paramount goals.
38
The court's opinion continues with a discussion of the limita-
tions upon government in seeking to favor procreation without
unnecessarily intruding into the couple's marital privacy. Procre-
ation as the basis for the state's recognition of marriage is
explored further in this issue of the Notre Dame Journal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy by Professor Richard Duncan in his article
Homosexual Manriage and the Myth of Tolerance: Is Cardinal
O'Connor a Homophobe?
III. DEFINITION OF FAMILY
Independent of whether procreation is the basis for state
recognition of marriage, the creation of new life radically trans-
forms the relationship of husband and wife. 9 This transforma-
tion is captured to some degree by casual remarks like "We've
postponed having a family," or "We are trying to start our family."
In this context the word "family" means the unique relationships
created by the birth of a child.' The conception of a child cre-
38. Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124-25 (C.D. Cal. 1980)
(rejecting claim that homosexual unions should be recognized as marriages for
immigration purposes), aff'd on other grounds 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982). See
also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("Marriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."); Singer v. Hara,
522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974):
[I]t is apparent that the state's refusal to grant a license allowing the
appellants to marry one another is not based upon appellants' status
as males, but rather it is based upon the state's recognition that our
society as a whole views marriage as the appropriate and desirable
forum for procreation and the rearing of children. This is true even
though married couples are not required to become parents and even
though some couples are incapable of becoming parents and even
though not all couples who produce children are married. These,
however, are exceptional situations. The fact remains that marriage
exists as a protected legal institution primarily because of societal
values associated with the propagation of the human race.
Singer, supra, at 1195. But see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding
that restriction of marriage to couples comprised of one female and one male
partner is subject to strict scrutiny in light of state constitutional guarantee of
equal protection).
39. See also Letter to Families, supra note 8, at Nos. 12, 16.
40. LAURENCE D. HOULGATE, FAMILY AND STATE: THE PHILOSOPHY OF
FAMILY LAW 25 (1988) ("[a]lthough sociologists and anthropologists disagree
1996]
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ates parent-child relationships, and alters the relationship
between husband and wife. Many couples believe that the birth
of a child creates a greater obligation to sustain the marriage. In
addition to changes within the marriage, the child's birth alters
the couple's relationship with others. Through the child, the
spouse is permanently engrafted upon the family tree, and
becomes a blood relative of people previously related in law
only.
The common law defined family as people related by mar-
riage, blood, or adoption.41 This definition confined the term
"family" to people whose lives were permanently connected.
With the permanence of marriage eroded through no-fault
divorce, and adoptive parents seeking to judicially set aside adop-
tion decrees,4" relationships based upon marriage or adoption
seem more temporary. Their continuing inclusion within the
definition of family makes it more difficult to distinguish other
relationships from those properly designated as family relation-
ships on the basis that "family" denotes lifetime commitments.
This has led to a search for other characteristics that might dis-
tinguish family from other relationships. Various traits have
been suggested including relationships based upon consent,
affection, or mutual support. How well do any of these charac-
teristics define the experience we seek to identify when using the
word family?
A. Consent
Consent is offered as the defining characteristic of marriage
more often than of family relationships. Yet with the wide-spread
use of contraception and abortion to avoid childbearing, the
relationship of parent and child, and more particularly mother
and child, is increasingly understood to be based upon the par-
ent's choice to bear the child. The idea that parental responsibil-
ities is based upon choice is reflected in Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey:43
about the precise meaning of this term, most are inclined to agree that a
common function of families is child-rearing.").
41. Village of Belle Terre v. Borass, 416 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1974) (upholding
zoning restriction which partially defined family as individuals related by
"blood, adoption or marriage").
42. In re Lisa Diane G., 537 A.2d 131 (R.I..1988) (permiting parents to
pursue nullifaction of adoption decree based upon claims of fraud by the
Department of Children and Their Families). But see Rich v. Rich, 364 S.E.2d
804 (W. Va. 1987) (rejecting petition to revoke adoption by step-parent on the
basis that marriage to natural parent terminated by divorce).
43. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Our cases recognize "the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Our
precedents "have respected the private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter." These matters, involving
the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of per-
sonhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.4 4
The choice of the woman is determinative of her obligations dur-
ing her pregnancy. Her decision, or consent to continue the
pregnancy, is also determinative of the father's choice, as illus-
trated by caselaw rejecting legislative attempts to condition the
woman's right to seek an abortion upon notification of her
husband.4 5
The inherent limitations upon any definition of family
grounded in consent is illustrated by the courts' unwillingness to
recognize choice or consent as a limitation upon the father's
obligations to an undesiredchild. Substantial precedent rejects
claims by putative fathers in paternity suits arguing that they
should be excused from financial liability either because they do
not wish to be fathers or because they offered to pay for an
abortion.'
In the context of legal representation, Professor Thomas
Shaffer has provided an eloquent critique of the consent-based
understanding of family:
Her [a wife's] affiliation with her husband, and with
the children they have made and reared, is seen as a prod-
uct of individuality(!), of contract and consent, of
promises and the keeping of promises-all the consensual
44. Id. at 851 (citations omitted).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., In re Paternity ofJ.L.H., 441 N.W.2d 273 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989);
Inez M. v. Nathan G., 451 N.Y.S.2d 607 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982); Harris v. State, 356
So.2d 623 (Ala. 1978); Shinall v. Pergeorelis, 325 So.2d 431 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975); and Linda D. v. Fritz C., 687 P.2d 223 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). Cf Davis v.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (finding that gamete provider's interest in
avoiding parenthood trumped egg provider's interest in donating embryo to
another couple).
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connections that lonely individuals use when they want cir-
cumstantial harmony. The employment of the lawyer is a
result, then, of the links, the promises, the contract, the
consent, and the need for circumstantial harmony. The
family in the office is there only as the product of promise
and consent. It is relevant to the legal business at hand
only because the (radical) individuals, each in momentary
and circumstantial harmony with one another, want it to
be. The promise and the consent create the family.
This description is offered by the legal ethics of radical
individualism. It is sad, corrupting, and untruthful. An
alternative argument is that the family created the
promises, the contract, the consent, and the circumstan-
tial harmony-not the other way around.... In these ordi-
nary ways of accounting to ourselves for ourselves, it is the
family that causes individuals to make the promises that
begin, develop, and continue families. The family causes
people to seek human harmonies and, consequently, to
create more families, as well as associations such as busi-
nesses, clubs, and professions, that account for themselves
with family metaphors.
4 7
Family is not based upon consent, beyond the initial consent of
the husband and wife when they enter into marriage. Children
do not consent to be born into families, yet they are members of
the family and create the future of the family. Without a sense of
connection to a family, the individual is set adrift in a largely
indifferent world. Yet a sense of connection, or even affection is
not sufficient to establish a family relationship.
B. Affection
Affection generally is defined as "kind feeling: tender attach-
ment".48 Affectionate relationships usually are marked by play-
fulness and pleasure. Between family members affection can
lighten shared burdens, and enhance shared joys. Affection is
grounded in the emotions of the person both in its genesis and
in its experience. The emotion is innate, but its depth is often a
product of shared experiences.
Defining family as those who share affection is appealing
when viewing family solely as a means of personal psychological
gratification. Such a definition includes people whose company
we enjoy and for whom we often are willing to suffer some incon-
47. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L.
REv. 963, 970-71 (1987) (emphasis in original).
48. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 35 (1986).
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venience. It excludes those who seem alien or foreign to us, or
who, by their conduct, invoke indifference or ill-will. Thus it is
possible to conceive of family as a relationship primarily based
upon shared affection. Yet this understanding is wrong. It is
wrong because it is empty of any sense of commitment. It fails to
recognize that, because we are self-contained as individuals, each
of us is alien to some greater or lesser degree. I am constantly
reminded of this as I watch my children grow from child within
me, with whom I shared some aspect of every experience, to
man- or woman-child who emerge as a mysterious other whom I
love. Similarly, even after eighteen years of marriage, my hus-
band continues to surprise me with new stories from his youth,
or new depth of his character previously beyond my view. Even
among family, the other whom we love is a mystery.
Affection often arises between family members by virtue of
their shared life, but its existence or absence is not the key to
discerning family relationship. As a product of emotion, affec-
tion ebbs and flows, in part in response to acts of others and in
part due to our own emotional state. This ebb and flow of affec-
tion may be reflected in the actions of family members, but the
duties and obligations owed to family members are constant.
The greatest gifts of self to others often include some element of
willfully overriding emotions that would preclude gifts of self.
Common examples include truthfully defending a sibling who
acted against your counsel, or forgiving a spouse for hurtful acts
before the hurt has completely subsided.
Affection can lead to the creation of family relationships
insofar as it often precedes marriage or adoption. Certainly the
presence of affection between family members encourages con-
tinued acceptance of the other person in the relationship. The
absence of affection can diminish the shared time and trust that
nourish family relationships. Ultimately, however, affection is
too ephemeral to act as the fundamental characteristic distin-
guishing family from other relationships.
C. Mutual Support
The positive law currently does not identify family by the
parties' consent or their shared affection. Mutual support, how-
ever, was and remains a key consideration in distinguishing fam-
ily from other relationships. Parents are required to provide
financial support to their children until the children attain the
age of majority,"9 and states are increasingly looking to adult chil-
49. E.g., Greenspan v. Slate, 97 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1953) (discussion of
historical foundation for common law parental duty of support).
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dren to support their aged parents. 50 Yet the limitations recog-
nized on the duty of financial support illustrate the limited utility
of using mutual support as the defining characteristic of family.
The adult son or daughter does not lose the status of family
member by virtue of his or her financial self-sufficiency. Parents
unable to provide the basic necessities of life do not forfeit the
respect due from their children merely because they suffer from
physical or educational limitations precluding support.5 '
While the positive law seeks only to enforce obligations of
financial support, it recognizes other aspects of familial support.
Examples of this recognition include the statutory preference for
family members in guardianship laws, 2 and the family consent
statutes that acknowledge family members' right to make health-
care decisions for incompetent patients.55 Compensation for loss
of consortium claims by parents and children attempt to quantify
the value of non-financial support.54
The exact nature of the support provided by family mem-
bers changes as the circumstances encountered by the family
change. Parents provide protection, education, moral guidance,
and discipline. Young children provide respect, purpose and
renewed wonder in the world. Older children provide vitality,
50. See, e.g., Ann Britton, America's Best Kept Secret: An Adult Child's Duty to
Support Aged Parents, 26 CAL. W. L. REv. 351 (1990); Catherine D. Byrd, Relative
Responsibility Extended: Requirement of Adult Children to Pay for Their Indigent
Parent's Medical Needs, 22 FAm. L.Q. 88 (1988).
51. E.g., In re A.S.C., 671 A.2d 942, 948, n.7 (D.C. 1996) ("parents'
poverty, in and of itself, would not be an appropriate ground for determining
that the child's best interests would be served by termination of parental
rights").
No one would say that the state would or should deprive the natural
parent of the custody of its child because dire poverty, which may
strike any of us, had stricken that parent. To the contrary, the state, in
recognition that poverty shall not be a ground for the severance of the
relation of parent and child, has made provision itself to aid in the
support of the children of the poor, the parents being expected to
contribute only in accordance with their limited means. It is only
when a parent has abandoned the child, or has been found
disqualified for other reasons than poverty alone, that under our law
the parental rights of guardianship are terminated and destroyed.
In re Mathews, 164 P. 8, 9 (Cal. 1917).
52. See Alison P. Barnes, Beyond Guardianship Reform: A Reevaluation of
Autonomy and Beneficence for a System of Principled Decision-Making in Long Term
Care, 41 EMORY L.J. 633, 686, 731 (1992).
53. See Charles Sabatino, Death in the Legislature: Inventing Legal Tools for
Autonomy, 19 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 309, 320 (1991-92).
54. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 125 (5th ed. 1984). See also Johnny Parker, Parental Consortium:
Assessing the Contours of the New Tort in Town, 64 Miss. LJ. 37 (1994).
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hope and respect. Grandparents provide perspective, restraint,
and wisdom. Aunts, uncles and cousins provide a sense of con-
nection and concern outside the nuclear family. They also
broaden the perspective of the family. The nature of the support
included in this partial listing suggests that mutual support can
not be quantified, and nor effectively compelled through positive
law. Yet all of them are integral to the family's recognition of the
strength and centrality of its identity in the world.
The definition of the family engaged in providing mutual
support, and its relationship to the individual's identity as a
member of a culture, people, or tribe is the focus of The Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978: Violating Personal Rights for the Sake of the
Tribe. Christine Bakeis struggles with the questions raised by fed-
eral legislation extending recognition of family-like rights to
members of Indian tribes in hopes of protecting the existence
and identity of Native Americans. Provocative questions are
posed concerning the desirability and the limits of positive law in
altering the dominant understanding of parent/child relation-
ships in American society.55
In contrast, Professor Melinda Roberts challenges the domi-
nant understanding of parental authority in her article Parent
and Child in Conflict: Between Liberty and Responsibility. She sug-
gests that current constitutional jurisprudence recognizes par-
ents' interests in fulfilling their responsibilities, yet fails to
adequately consider the child's desires and provide some avenue
of legal enforcement of those desires. In place of what she char-
acterizes as a "parent-centered model" of judicial decision-mak-
ing, she argues that the law should recognize the decisions of
children involving their fundamental rights, when those deci-
sions are not inconsistent with their long-term best interest.
Both articles assume that the positive law is constitutive of
family obligations. Each author questions the content of current
law regulating the creation or destruction of family bonds.
Neither fully account for the idea that family may exist independ-
ent of the positive law, and provide an independent sphere of
authority which should be afforded great latitude as an
"independent sovereign."
It is this failure to assert familial independence from many
of the current attempts to define and regulate family relation-
ships that distinguish these authors from Professor Douglas
Kmiec. His book Cease-Fire on the Family: The End of the Culture War
55. For a general discussion of the the limits of federal law in the sphere
of domestic relations, see Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA.
L.REv. 1787 (1995).
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is premised upon the idea that families, not legislatures or
judges, define the future of individuals, marriage, family, and
ultimately our nation. ProfessorJames Hitchcock and Allan Carl-
son review this book and its underlying premise in their articles
The Cease-Fire May Be Premature ... Reactions to Cease-Fire on the
Family, and A Separate Peace. While both Professor Hitchcock and
Mr. Carlson are sympathetic to the premise, they express some
reservations about the degree of independence that the family
can achieve from contemporary culture, which in turn is signifi-
candy shaped by the structure of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
And so this foreword ends as it began, with questions about
the relationship of marriage and family to the positive law and
the society that creates and is created by these three powerful
human institutions. Law, with its pervasive power to frame
human understanding of individual situations, affirms or chal-
lenges the intuitive response of the person to the reality exper-
ienced. Marriage, as a product of initial consent and continuing
commitment, provides a powerful testimony to the human capac-
ity to accept and give to the other. Family, with its insoluble tie
of flesh and blood, constantly challenges the ideas that consent is
the only legitimate foundation for binding commitments, and
that all ties are subject to severance at will. The strength of this
issue of the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, and Public Policy is its
blend of authors, each with a slightly different perception of the
nature of family and its place in society, yet equally committed to
the value of enduring human relationships.
